The EU Proposals to Regulate Tech Platforms

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1. Political drivers

- Protectionism
 - Protect EU firms and/or the 'losers' of digital disruption (who can be very powerful)
- Concentration of economic, innovation and informational powers among few players

- Unfair results: most of the added value is captured by few innovative firms
 - esp. because their taxation is (still) very low
- Loss of autonomy of citizens, business users and States
 - Need to take back control!



2. Political choices

- Ex ante regulation to complement ex post antitrust
- Market contestability and long term innovation incentives
 - User choice and autonomy/self-determination
 - Business users innovation over gatekeepers innovation
 - Long term over short term
- Opening the platforms instead of breaking them up
- Rules instead of standards
- Centralised EU enforcement instead of decentralised national enforcement

3. Improvement possibilities New Eighteen Commandments

- Regulatory design: rules and standards
 - Detailed rules for existing obligation
 - Broad discretion for new obligations
 - Need to have more principles-based rules



- Regulatory enforcement: individualisation
 - Too little, too implicit "One size fits all" flavour
 - Need to provide for gatekeeper defence: no harm to contestability and fairness
 - And Commission escape clause

Enforcement mode

Antitrust mode

- Bi-lateral (adversarial) dialogue between the European Commission and platforms
- Need a regulatory mode: ecosystem of enforcement
 - Platforms: internal mechanisms
 - Business and end-users
 - Complaint, remedy design, monitoring
 - Civil society (vetted data researchers)
 - National antitrust, data protection, telecom agencies
 - Complaint, remedy design, monitoring

4. Is this a Revolution?



Digital Markets Acts

- DMA is a welcome revolution
 - First asymmetric EU law on online platforms
- But is mostly based on the traditional EU policy choices
 - Ex ante regulation complementing ex post antitrust
 - Ordo-liberalism
 - Open Platform
 - Except for centralised enforcement
- Possible improvements
 - More **flexibility** in the rules while being mindful of the powers of the gatekeeper to abuse this flexibility
 - Broader ecosystem of enforcement